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DAVID J. BERCEAU #0301 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
Plaintiff/Respondent , 
-vs- Case No. 890529-CA 
GREGORY DOUGLAS THOMAS * 
Defendant/Appellant ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does the failure of defense counsel in not making 
proper discovery, in not making proper preparation for trial, 
in not makinq sure proper jury instruction is given to the 
jury, in not making objections to erroneous and misleading 
jury instruction, in not making objections at trial to 
hearsay and prejudicial questions, in not objecting to the 
trial judges failure to make a ruling on objections, in not 
objecting to prosecutions alleging that the market value 
of the pallets is $8.00, in not bringing in more expert 
testimony as to value of the pallets, in not objecting to 
prosecutors improper closinq argument, or in not calling 
witnesses to support defendants case amount to ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
5 
2. Does the submission of an improper jury 
instruction to the jury constitute material error. 
3. Did the jury err in finding that the value 
of the pallets was sufficient to find the defendant guilty 
of a third degree felony. 
4. Did the closing argument of the State 
constitute prosecutorial misconduct by making misstatements as 
to value and by making misleading and confusing statements 
as to value. 
5. Should a new trial have been granted on the 
errors made at trial concerning the value of the pallets, in 
allowing the wrong jury instruction to go to the jury, by 
allowing prejudicial evidence without probative value into the 
trial and by not granting a new trial on becoming aware of 
the true value of the pallets in question. 
6. Should Thomas have been convicted of theft. 
PERTINENT STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const. Amend 6 
U.C.A. 30-1-4 & 5 
U.C.A. 76-6-101(4) 
U.R. Crim. P. 19(c) 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Section 78-2a-3 (2) (f) confers 
jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals to 
decide this appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF CAFE 
This is a criminal case in which the defendant 
was charged with the theft of forty (40) Pallets from 
Knox McDaniel Company• 
The case was tried in front of a jury before Judge 
Stanton M. Taylor. The trial took place in Ogden, Utah on 
May 25, 1989. After a day of testimony the jury found 
the defendant quilty of one count of theft, a third 
degree felony. Judge Stanton M. Taylor subsequently 
sentenced the defendant to jail for a period of time not 
to exceed sixty (60) days. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On January 10, 1989 the defendant Gregory Douglas 
Thomas who was in the pallet business traveled to Ogden, 
Utah to borrow some pallets from some businesses. In his 
search for pallets he came to the Knox McDaniel Company, 
a company that produces livestock, poultry and swine vitamins 
and mineral premixes. (Tr. 18-19) At Knox McDaniel the 
defendant approached the plant manager John Eric Erickson 
to enquire about the pallets (Tr. 19). In talking with Mr. 
Erickson the defendant asked him if he had any pallets he 
could borrow. Mr. Erickson after checking the inventory found 
that he could give the defendant 40 pallets. (Tr. 20). 
The defendant after receiving permission to borrow 
40 pallets then went to see Sheryl Cheever, a secretary for 
Knox McDaniel, who was to draw up the agreement. (Tr.36) 
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Ms. Cheevers was to write down the terms of the agreement 
on a piece of paper. The terms were to include the date 
of return (one week later) the amount of deposit (at first 
to be $50.00 which was changed to $30.00) , license and 
phone number, (Tr. 36). Mr. Thomas presented his driver's 
license to Ms. Cheevers and gave her the required information. 
(Tr. 59-60). However, in writing down the numbers she had 
mistakenly written down 643VE for the license plate number 
instead of 643BE the true number. For the phone number Ms. 
Cheever erred in that she had written 272-3051 when the 
true number was 272-3052. (Tr.60). In both instances the 
errors were only one off. 
The defendant Mr. Thomas signed the paper failing to 
note the errors and left Knox McDaniel without correcting 
the errors made on the information sheet. (Tr.60) After a 
months passing Mr. Erickson called the number on the 
information sheet. Mr. Erickson, not knowing that a mistake 
had been made concerning the phone number could not get the 
defendant Thomas. (Tr. 24-25). Mr. Erickson thinking that 
he had been duped called the police on what normally would 
have been a civil matter for breech of contract. (Tr.25). 
After the police were called Detective John Stubbs 
of the Ogden Police Department began an investigation. He 
first interviewed Mr. Erickson, then followed up on the 
license plate number and found two numbers one of which belonged 
to Greg Thomas. (Tr. 42). Following upon this the detective 
and an associate drove to Salt Lake City to track down Mr. 
Thomas. (Tr.44). In finding Mr. Thomas the detective pulled 
him over. (Tr.44). Mr. Thomas after having his Miranda rights 
read agreed to talk with the detective. (Tr.45-46). 
In talking with the detective Greg Thomas admitted 
that he had taken the pallets (which he was allowed to do 
under the agreement he had with Erickson) and that he was 
going to bring the pallets back, but hadn't gotten around 
to returning them. (Tr.46). The detective then arrested 
Thomas, cuffed him, placed him in the police car and took 
him back to Ogden (Tr.46-48). During the trip back to Ogden 
defendant Thomas wanted to know what was going on and 
detective Stubbs stated that by admitting to the crime it 
would go a l°ncJ way to clearing this matter up. (Tr.48) . 
Greg Thomas thinking that by telling the detective what he 
wanted to hear the whole matter would be cleared up stated 
that he had taken the pallets.(Tr. 68) In making this mistake 
Thomas gave false information to the detective saying that 
he took the pallets and sold them to APCO Pallet Company. 
(Tr.68) However, what really transpired was that the pallets 
were not sold to APCO Pallet Company, but instead the pallets 
were given to Certified Warehouse who needed the pallets for 
a rush order. (Tr.78-81) Mr. Greg Thomas said that if not 
for the order he would not have needed the pallets from 
Knox McDaniel because he had 3000 pallets that he was storing 
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Peck's Pallets in Bountiful which was closed at the time 
Thomas needed the pallets. (Tr.82). 
All of the above facts are what led to the trial 
on May 25, 1989. The facts at trial for the convenience of 
the appeals court are broken into the varies areas of the 
appeal. This will allow the brief to be concise and more 
direct in dealing with the issues that are raised in the 
appeal. 
The factual occurances at trial that will be used 
in arguing ineffective assistance of counsel are as follows: 
Defense counsels failure to object to the admission of 
exhibits one and two, to the value of pallets assumed 
by Knox McDaniel, to the comments of Detective about Thomas 
leaving a bad trailf to Detective Stubbs failure to answer 
questions, to Stubbs declaration that defendant committed 
a third degree felony, to use of 0 R report, to questions 
about defendants marital status, to question on assessed 
value of pallets by wholesalers, to the erroneous jury 
instruction, to errors in prosecutors closing arguments, and 
to misleading and confusing statements of prosecutor in 
his closing arguments. (Tr.23, 27, 34, 43, 46, 51, 71, 89, 
104, 113-119, 129-130). 
Along with these factual occurances the defendant 
contends that counsel should have conducted discovery to 
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learn of the errors in the contract and jury instruction on 
market value. (Tr.39,104) In addition to the above allegations 
Thomas contends that his attorney err ed in not requesting 
Judge to rule on objections made. (Tr.43, 72, 64). Also the 
defendant claims that his attorney failed to question witnesses 
properly and call needed witnesses. 
The jury instruction defendant Thomas contends to be 
erroneous is the one concerning value which states that: 
"When the value of property alleged to have 
been taken by theft must be determined, the 
reasonable and fair market value at the time 
and in the locality of the theft shall be the 
test. Fair market value is the highest price, 
in cash, for which the property would have sold 
in the open market at that time and in that 
locality, 
1. If the owner was desirous of selling, but under 
no urgent necessity of doing so; 2. If the buyer 
was desirous of buying but under no urgent 
necessity of doing so, 3. If the seller had a 
reasonable time within to find a purchaser; and 
4. If the buyer had knowledge of the character 
of the property and of the uses to which it 
might be put." (Tr. 104-105) 
When tthis instruction was proposed no objections were 
raised by any of the parties as to the instructions validity. 
The defendant intends to use the entire trial record 
to show that the jury erred in finding that the market 
value of the pallets was enough to find that it amounted to 
a third degree felony. 
As for defendants claim of prosecutorial misconduct 
he points to the closing argument of the State at trial 
which contained several references to the value of the 
pallets of $8.00. (Tr. 110-121, 129-134) Also in the 
closing argument the prosecutor tells a story about the 
biting of a mailman by a dog and what followed the biting. 
(Tr. 129-130) 
Defendant Thomas also contends that the trial judge 
erred in allowing the wrong jury instruction and in not 
granting a new trial upon learning of this error. (Tr.104-105) 
In addition the $8.00 value claimed by the prosecutor should 
not have been allowed into the record. Also in error is the 
admission of prejudicial or report descrepencies into the 
record. (Tr. 71) 
The entire trial record will also be used to show 
that the jury errored in reaching its verdict of guilty. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The first contention of defendant Thomas is that 
he did not have effective assistance of counsel at his trial. 
2. Defendant Thomas argues that the trial court 
erred in allowing an erroneous jury instruction as to 
the material element of value to go to the jury. 
3. The third thrust of Greg Thomas's appeal is 
that the jury wrongfully considered the wrong value 
concerning the pallets. 
4. Defendant Thomas also contends that the closing 
argument of the prosecutor at the close of trial constituted 
prosecutorial misconduct in that it contained mistatements 
as well as confusing and misleading comments• 
5. The defendant also contends that the judge errored 
in allowing the wrong jury instruction, the wrong value 
of pallets and prejudicial evidence to go to the jury. 
6. The final argument of the defendant is that the 
jury had insufficient evidence to arrive at a verdict of 
guilty to a third degree felony. 
I THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Under the Constitution of the United States the 
accused in all criminal prosecutions is guaranteed the 
right to have "Assistance of Counsel". U.S. Const. Amend 6. 
Defendant Thomas argues that his right to assistance of counsel 
was denied, in that his counsel was ineffective. 
The test for showing ineffective assistance of counsel 
was established by the United States Supreme Court case 
Darden vs. Wainwright, 196 S.Ct. 2464, 477 U.S. 168, 91 L.Ed. 
2d 1444 (1986). Wainwright states that a "Defendant claiming 
ineffective assistance of counsel must show that counsels 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
and that counsels representation fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsels unprofessional errors, the result 
would have been different." The defendant contends that the 
result would have been different had counsel met a reasonable 
standard of professionalism. 
The facts at trial support the defendants allegation 
that he was not represented at trial by effective assistance 
of counsel and that this ineffective assistance of counsel 
resulted in a judgment contrary to what would have occurred 
had defense counsel been competent. The first of these 
facts involves the defendants counsels failure to object. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that one who is suspected 
or accused of a crime has a right to have competent counsel 
who will take such actions and present whatever objections 
he can in honesty and good conscience justify in the interest 
of his client. Utah vs. Grey, 605 P.2d 1918 (Utah, 1979). 
The defense attorney in the Thomas case failed to 
make objections that he could have in "honesty and good 
conscience" made on several occassinns. The first of these 
failures occurred when counsel failed to object to the 
admission of exhibits one and two. Exhibit one should have 
been objected to before admission in that John Eric Erickson 
did not draw up the contract, nor did he witness the making 
of the contract, nor did he have knowledge that this was the 
contract in question except through hearsay testimony. In 
other words Defense counsel could have objected to the fact 
that there was no foundation as to the knowledge of Erickson 
that this was the contract or that this was the contract that 
defendant signed. Along with the no foundation objection, 
a hearsay objection could have been made in that he only 
knew of this contract through another. (Tr.23) 
Exhibit two's admission into the record is even more objectional 
in that it allowed into evidence an erroneous market value 
concerning pallets. The defense counsel did object but was 
so incompetent that he made the wrong objectionf which was 
that the "value is determined legally11 and that it was not 
the value we are "talking about here at trial." (Tr. 27) 
What should have occured is that counsel should have objected 
more vehemently by contesting the admission of the exhibit 
as having no foundation, as being hearsay, as being erroneous 
in that the value in exhibit two was the deposit value not 
the value for which the pallets would sell for on the market 
in Ogden and that Erickson was no expert in that he was not in 
the business of building, selling or buying pallets and had no 
knowledge of what a pallet would cost. 
Defense counsel also failed to object to the value 
as to what Knox McDaniel was charged for the pallets that came 
to their company. (Tr. 34) The objection should have been 
made because the $8.00 value Knox McDaniel paid was a deposit 
value not a market value and that to allow the $8.00 value into 
the trial was material error in that it was misleading, 
irrelevant, immaterial, prejudicial and in error to allow that 
value to stand as market value. The failure of defense counsel 
to object to this material element is incompetence. 
Defense counsel also failed to object at trial to 
testimony of Detective John Stubbs that his client was leaving 
a bad trail. (Tr.43). By allowing this.evidence into the 
record the defendant was prejudiced by this comment that 
was not based on any evidence and was not substantiated by 
any facts. The defendants counsel further prejudiced his 
client by not objecting to the detective's failure to 
just answer his question of "What specifically did he tell 
you, to the best of your recollection." In that John Stubbs 
stated that he skirted some information by not answering my 
question. (Tr. 46) By allowing the detective to make that 
statement unchallenged defense counsel made his client 
look like a liar. Counsel should have pointed out that the 
detective was not answering his question and that just 
because someone does not answer a question doesn't mean he's 
skirting an issue. 
Counsel for the defendant further gave inadequate 
protection to his client by allowing the detective to state 
at trial that the deferidant had committed a third degree felony. 
(Tr.51) This statement further prejudiced the defendants 
rights in that the detective was allowed to comment on the 
value of the pallets though he had no knowledge of market value 
nor replacement costs nor any type of experience in the 
pallet business. 
The defense attorney further failed his client by not 
objecting to the prosecutors attacks on the defendants 
marital status. (Tr.71-72) These attacks were made after 
the defendant stated at trial that he was married even though 
he had allegedly stated in his O.R. report that he was single. 
Defense counsel should have objected to the prosecutors 
questioning of Greg Thomas on his marital status by 
stressing to the Court that Common Law marriages are 
recognized as valid in the State of Utah under U.C.A. 
30-1-4 & 5. The defendant should have further objected 
to the marital Questions because they were irrelevant and 
immaterial as to the alledaed theft. The questions were 
also prejudicial and without probative value in that 
they made the defendant look cruilty no matter which way 
he answered. In fact, defense counsel erred further by 
not challenging the prosecutors use of the O.R. report 
that had no foundation. Finally an attack could have 
been made on the admittance of the O.R. report as hearsay 
in that it was never authenticated. 
The defendant's counsel continued to fail his client 
by not objecting to prosecutors questioning of the APCO 
Pallet Company expert witness on assessed value of a pallet 
for a business that ships pallets only. (Tr. 89) This 
question by the prosecutor was irrelevant, immaterial and 
misleading in that it had nothincr to do with Market Value 
or replacement costs of pallets. 
Defense Counsel further prejudiced his client by not 
objecting to the Judges failure to allow the expert witness 
to give the market value of pallets and for not allowing 
defense counsel to question his witness. (Tr. 92). Market 
value was an element to the theft and was material to this 
case yet defense counsel allowed the prosecutor to object and 
the Judge to err in not allowing an expert to testify as 
to market value. This error was further muddled when the 
Judge by saying "But at any rate, the testimony is done* 
when there had been no indication by defense counsel that 
he was done. (Tr. 92) This all happened without any 
objection by defendants counsel. 
The defendants counsel also failed to object to 
the prosecutors closing arguments that the market value of 
the pallets was $8.00 which was never established, and is 
misleading and prejudicial in that it went to the jury 
as fact. (Tr. 113) Defense counsel could have also 
objected to prosecutors comments on the defendants marriage 
as prejudicial, immaterial and irrelevant in that Common 
Law Marriages are recognized by the State of Utah and that 
defendants marital status had no connection with the alleged 
theft of pallets. (Tr. 116) And finally defense counsel 
failed to object to prosecutors closinq argument story 
on a mailman. This mailman story about a dog biting a mailman 
was confusing, misleadina, immaterial, irrelevant and 
prejudicial in that it said that the prosecution personally 
believed that defendant was guilty and lying, though it gave 
no facts to supoort these allegations nor did it have any 
connection to the facts of this case. (Tr. 129 & 130). 
Generally a court of appeals will not consider matters 
raised for first time on appeal without a timely objection 
made at trial; however the appeals court can consider assignments 
of error where no objection is raised at trial where 
incompetence of counsel is at issue.State vs. Wright, 765 
P.2d 12 (Ut. App., 1988) This rule is also supported by 
Utah vs. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah, 1982). 
In addition rule 103 (a)(1) of the Rules of Evidence 
requires a timely objection, however, Rule 103(d) allows 
for consideration of "'Plain errors1 affectinq substantial 
riqhts althouqh they were not brought to the attention of 
the Court." In State vs. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (1989), the 
Utah Supreme Court defined "plain error" as "errors that 
we deem harmful, and although they were not properly perceived 
below, they are raised on appeal and we conclude that their 
erroneous charactor should be deemed obvious." In this 
case the above errors are obvious and likewise are the following 
errors that occurred at trial. 
Counsel had an obligation to conduct a reasonable 
amount of pretrial investigation on the behalf of defendant 
Thomas. U.S. vs. Bodour, 813 F.2d 1232, 259 U.S. App. D.C. Ill 
(1987) This duty to investigate is based on a reasonableness 
standard which was established in Mitchel vs. Kemp, 762 
F.2d 886-rehearincr denied 768 F.2d 1353, Cert, denied 107 
S. Ct. 3248, 483 U.S. 1026, 97 L. Ed. 2d. 774 (C.A. 11 6A, 1985). 
Defendant contends that this reasonableness standard was 
denied because defense counsel failed to conduct proper 
discovery which is evidenced by defense counsel failure 
to know what numbers were in error in the contract a material 
element in the case against the defendant. (Tr. 39) In 
addition he did not research the market value of the 
pallets, nor proper jury instructions, common law marriage 
statutes, nor additional experts on value of pallets because 
if he did he would have opposed the $8.00 value, kept out 
prejudicial materials, had more witnesses with knowledge 
of pallets and placed proper jury instructions with jury. 
If defense counsel had prepared it would have showed at 
trial, instead what we see is incompetants. 
Defendant's counsel was also ineffective in that he 
did not call available expert witnesses from Pecks Pallets, 
H & S Pallets (Kaysville), Bowen Enterprises (Ogden), 
Security Pallets (Ogden)and Well Enterprises (Salt Lake) 
who were ready and willing to testify at trial that the 
market value of the pallets in the Thomas case would have 
ranged from $3.75 to $4.75 per pallet. In State vs. Crestoni, 
771 P.2d 1085 (Utah App. 1989) citing Jennings vs. State, 
744 P.2d 212 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) stated 
"when counsel knows of the existence of a 
person or persons who possess information 
relevant to his client's defense and he 
fails to use due diligence to investigate 
that evidence, such a lack of industry 
cannot be justified as strateaic error! 
The American Bar Association Standards 
for Criminal Justice, Defense Function 
4-4.1, maintain that: !It is the duty 
of the lawyer to conduct a prompt 
investigation of the circumstances 
of the case and to explore all avenues 
leading to facts relevant to the merits 
of the case and the penalty in the event 
of conviction!f" 
In not calling these available witnesses counsel 
shows a severe deficiency in performance. This deficiency 
injured his clients chances because the jury was unable 
to see that the pallet values given by APCO Pallet Company 
were correct and that the $8.00 value was in error and 
nothing more than smoke blown by the prosecutor. 
Another error made by Defense Counsel was made 
when he failed to get the Judge to rule on two objections. 
The first objection not ruled on was "Objection, your Honor, 
to the characterization of whoever Rockie Mountain Pallet is", 
made by defense counsel. The Judges response was "Yeah. 
Why don't you go ahead with the questioning". (Tr. 43). 
This is not a ruling and it is not known if the Judge sustains 
or over rules. This leaves the jury thinking there was no 
problem and that the Judge is showing disfavor to the defendantf 
by belittling him. The Second objection in which this 
occurs is when the prosecutor objects to the Expert Witness 
testimony on market value. (Tr. 92 ) The judcres response 
is "Well I suppose market value is probably a term of 
art specifically defined in the code, and I'm not sure 
it would be appropriate - -". (Tr. 92) Here defense 
counsel fails to get a ruling on the prosecutor's objection 
and allows the judge to keep out probative and valid 
information without so much as a word of protest. This 
is prejudicial to the defendant and further defines the 
incompetants of defense counsel. The Defense counsel 
just failed to establish any record on the behalf of 
his client. 
In additon to the above errors defense counsel 
further errpd his client by allowing an erroneous 
instruction to go to the jury. This error, in fact, was 
a breach of duty by counsel in that he had a duty to 
tender the correct jury instruction as to market value. 
Arelleno vs. People, 493 P.2d 1312, 177 Colo. 286 (1972) 
State vs. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d 688 (Utah App. 1989) This 
court stated that it was "difficult for us to evision how 
counsel's failure to request the appropriate instruction 
would not be prejudicial". It is even far worse if the 
wrong jury instruction that goes to the jury is material 
to the elements. State vs. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah, 1980). 
Because when an instruction is in error as to the elements 
it is reversable error. State vs. Reddy, 681 P.2d 1251 
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(Utah 1984) In this appeal the defendant argues that his 
attorney erred in not presenting the proper jury instructions 
as to the elements of market value to the jury. 
If the Court finds that the second argument of this 
appeal was correct in that the wrong jury instruction was 
used at trial, then the court must find that defense 
counsel was ineffective in that the proper instruction 
would have made the jury's verdict more favorable to the 
defendant. Moritzsky However, even without including this 
argument on the wrong jury instruction the appeals court 
has enough errors by defense counsel before it that they 
can rule ineffective assistance of counsel. If this 
court finds that any of 'counsels errors' prejudiced the 
defendant then a reasonable probability exists that but for 
defense counsels acts or omissions the verdict would have 
been more favorable to the defendant. Moritzsky 
In fact, it would be impossible for this court to 
rule that counsels performance was not prejudicial and if 
they cannot find that defendants counsel did not prejudice 
his client and there is a reasonable likelihood that their 
would be a different result than there are grounds for 
the trial to be reversed and set-aside. Codianna vs. Morris, 
660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983), State vs. Costoneda, 724 P.2d 
1, 150 Ariz. 382 (1986). If the court feels that error in 
one area can't be reversed they should be able to find that 
the foreqoing improprieties and errors, or the cumulative 
effect of them all, that this Court should conclude that 
the right of defendant to a fair trial was substantially 
and adversely affected and should order that defendant be 
granted a new trial at which such improprieties can be 
avoided, 
II; THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING 
THE WRONG JURY INSTRUCTION CONCERNING 
VALUE TO GO TO THE JURY 
At the trial of Gregory Douglas Thomas on May 
25, 1989 the Judge submitted the following jury instruction 
concerning the value of property alleged to have been taken 
by theft to the jury. 
"When the value of property alleged to have 
been taken by theft must be determined, the 
reasonable and fair market value at the time 
and in the locality of the theft shall be the 
test. Fair market value is the highest price, 
in cash, for which the property would have 
sold in the open market at that time and * in 
that locality, 1. If the owner was desirous 
of selling, but under no urgent necessity of 
doing so; 2. If the buyer was desirous of 
buying but under no urgent necessity of doing 
so; 3. If the seller had a reasonable time 
within which to find a purchaser; 4. If the 
buyer had knowledge of the character of the 
property and of the uses to which it might be 
put." (Tr. 104) 
O A 
The defendant contends that this is the wrong 
iury instruction because the pallets in question were not 
recovered and that the jury instruction that established 
the basis for determining value of the stolen property 
was in error. The jury instruction that is more appropriate 
Utah Code which states that 
is taken from the^ frvalue means": U.C.A. 76-6-101(4). 
(a) The market value of the property, if 
totally destroyed, at the time and place 
of the offense, or where cost of 
replacement exceeds the market value; or 
(b) Where the market value cannot be 
ascertained, the cost of repairing or 
replacing the property within a reasonable 
time following the offense; 
(c) If the property damaged has a value 
that cannot be ascertained by the criteria 
set forth in subsections (a) and (b) above, 
the property shall be deemed to have a 
value not to exceed $50.00. 
The defendant argues that since the pallets 
in question were never recovered that they are considered 
destroyed and U.C.A. 76-6-101 applies. In State vs. Logan 
563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977) the Utah Supreme Court found 
that the Common Law instruction used by the trial judge 
is for property that has been "Stolen but later recovered," 
and that U.C.A. 76-6-101 applies to property that is 
destroyed. This same finding was supported by State vs. 
Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985). Mo definition exists in 
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the Utah Code for destroyed however Blacks law dictionary 
defines destroy as meaning "to ruin completely and may 
include a taking". Defendant contends that to destroy 
does constitute a taking and therefore the jury instruction 
in 76-6-101(4) is the instruction that should have been 
given to the jury in that it deals with destroyed property. 
To further make this point the defendant places emphasis 
on the fact that the Supreme Court in Logan and Carter found 
that the common law statute applied to instances where the 
property was recovered. 
Generally the Supreme Court will not reverse 
convictions for mere error or irregularity, however, where 
there is error which has a substantial effect upon defendants 
right to a fair trial in that without the error there is 
a reasonable liklihood that there would have been a different 
result, the court should reverse. State vs. Kazda, 54 0 
P.2d 949 (Utah, 1975) State v. Neely, 748 P.2d 1091 (Utah, 1988). 
State vs. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313 (Utah, 1985). In the Thomas 
case the defendant argues that with the proper jury instruction 
he would not have been convicted of a third degree felony and 
that a reversal is in order. In Gcases where an accurate 
instruction upon the basic elements of the offense charged 
are in error then that error constitutes reversible error. 
State vs. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah, 1980). 
The defendant further contends that the market 
value of the pallets is a material element of the crime of 
theft and that the failure to instruct the jury on the 
proper elements of a crime is reversible error. State 
vs. Reddy, 681 P.2d 1251 (Utah, 1984). State vs. Roberts, 
711 P.2d 235 (Utah, 1985). In addition 19(c) of the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure states that error may be assigned to 
instructions in order to avoid a manefest injustice". 
To prevent an injustice Thomas alleges that his conviction 
should be reversed because of the error in the trial courts 
use of the wrong jury instruction. The defendant further 
claims that the jury instruction effected the value of the 
pallets which is a material element of the crime of theft 
and therefore it's use had a substantial effect upon the 
defendants rights. 
The reason the defendant contends the proper 
jury instruction would change the result at trial is that it 
would have used replacement vlaue instead of market value. 
If isn't that market value would not be appropriate in 
using 76-6-101 (4)(a) which states "that value means market 
value if totally destroyed, at the time and place of the 
offense, or where cost of replacement exceeds the market 
value." However, "where market value cannot be ascertained" 
as in this case then "the cost of repairing or replaceing 
the property within a reasonable time following the offense", 
is the value placed on the pallets. 76-6-101(4)(b). 
The defendant argues that 76-6-101 (4) (b) is 
the appropriate instruction to use in that at trial market 
value could not be found. The defendant contends that the 
market value should have been around $4.50 which was 
supported by expert testimony where as the prosecutor 
contends that the value should be $8.00 the deposit value. 
With no agreeable value at trial the court then would have 
had to use the replacement cost which was $4.50. (Tr. 85). 
This value would have effected the elements of theft by 
making the value of the pallets taken $180.00 a class A 
misdemeanor and since the general rule is that accurate 
instructions upon basic elements of an offense is essential 
and failure to give an accurate instruction is reversible 
error the defendant contends that he is entitled to a new 
trial. Roberts. 
III. THE MARKET VALUE USED BY THE JURY 
TO MAKE ITS DECISION AS TO VALUES IS 
IN ERROR 
The $8.00 value of pallets used by the jury to 
convict Thomas of a third degree felony was in error. The 
proper value should have been $4.50 the true market value 
and the correct replacement cost. In State vs. Carter, 
the Utah Supreme Court ruled that "a jury may not disregard 
expert testimony as to the fair-market value of stolen 
property and fix a higher value when there is no basis in 
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the evidence properly before the court to justify that value". 
The jury in the Thomas case does ignore the expert testimony 
as to value by disregarding Jaimie Puckett's of A.P.CO. 
Pallet Company testimony that the value of the pallets should 
have been $4.50. Instead the jury chose to use the $8.00 
value used as a deposit at Knox McDaniel. This $8.00 value 
had no basis as market value in that there is no basis in 
the evidence that a deposit value can be considered market 
value. Nor was there any evidence that the $8.00 value can 
be attributed to the pallet industry. 
In Chess vs. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah, 1980) 
the Utah Supreme Court ruled that an erroraneous conviction 
is as much an affront to Societies interest in the fair 
administration of justice as it is to an individual rights. 
The jury in the Thomas case did erroraneously convict the 
defendant of a third degree felony by ignoring the correct 
marfeet value of the pallets. State vs. Watson
 i6 684 P. 2d 
39 (Utah, 1984) states that this reviewing Court has the 
power to review a case on the sufficiency of the evidence. 
It is the argument of the defendant that the evidence was 
not sufficient to convict the defendant of a third degree 
felony and therefore this court should overturn that verdict. 
State vs. Hutchinson, 655 P.2d 635 (Utah, 1982) states that 
when an error is substantial or prejudicial and effected 
the outcome, then that case should be overturned. Defendant 
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argues that the error which is substantial and prejudicial 
in the Thomas case is the $8.00 deposit value used as 
market value by the jury to convict the defendant of a third 
degree felony. The use of this $8.00 value also affected 
the verdict in that the proper vlaue should have been $4.50 
which would have resulted in the defendant being convicted 
of a misdemeanor. Therefore the defendant asks that his 
due process rights and right to a fair trial be protected 
by granting the defendant Thomas a new trial. 
IV. THE CLOSING ARGUMENT OF THE PROSECUTOR 
AMOUNTED TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State vs. Andreason, 
718 P.2d 400 (Utah, 1986) stated that the "Standard applicable 
to reviewing allegedly prejudicial remarks of counsel is 
whether remarks call attention of jurors to matters they would 
not be justified in considering in their verdict, and, if so 
defendant must show that, under particular circumstances of 
the case, jurors were probably influenced by improper remarks 
in reaching their verdict". The remarks the defendant attacks 
were made in the prosecutors closing arguments. Andreason 
also says that to determine whether an improper argument was 
prejudicial then you must also consider the record because 
if it shows compelling proof that the verdict was valid then 
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the court will not consider the prosecutors misconduct. 
In the Thomas case there is no compelling proof that the 
verdict was without eirur when not using prosecutors 
midconduct. In fact the trial itself has far more errors 
than the prosecutor-has in his closing argument. 
The first of the errors made in the closing 
argument was the emphasis made by prosecutor of the $8.00 
deposit value as market value. (Tr. 113) This is an 
error in that it misleads the jurors by making them believe 
that the value of the pallets was $8.00 and used that 
deposit value to convict the defendant of a third degree 
felony. The fact that the prosecutor stated that the $8.00 
value was "the value of the property to the victim." 
The truth is that the value to the victim has nothing 
to do with market value and is a mistatement of the law. 
This mistatement as to Market value is prejudicial and is 
misleading in that it gives the wrong process for determining 
value. What this does is calls to attention of the jury 
matters which vould not have been allowed to be presented 
to them which probably had an influence upon them. Actions 
of this type by the prosecutor are grounds for a new trial. 
State vs. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48 (Utah, 1983). 
The defendant also alleges that the prosecutor 
was out of order in telling this following story: 
"A mailman was walking down the street. A 
dog came running out as he went to deposit 
some mail in the mailbox, bit him on the 
leg. He reported to supervisors who then 
contacted the individual who hadn' t kept 
the dog tied up. The Post Office instituted 
a proceeding and the individual was brought 
in who owned the dog. They said: Mr. Jones, 
your dog bit our postal worker. Mr. Jones 
said: Well, that can't be. My dog doesn't 
have teeth, couldn't have—couldn't have bit 
this guy. The individual pulls his pant let 
up and sure enough, there were teeth marks. 
He said: You know, that can't be. My dog 
doesn't run loose. The Post Office paraded 
a couple of people in that live next door 
and they said the dog runs loose all the time. 
Well, he said: You know, you're right, but it 
still can't be because I don't have a dog." 
(Tr. 129-130) 
The above story is prejudicial, misleading, 
confusing, immaterial and irrelevant in that it states 
that the defendant is like the man in the story always 
lying to protect his interest. The prosecutor does this 
through implication without giving any evidence to support 
this implication. This story allowed the prosecutor to 
attack the defendant in a subtle matter without having 
to support it with evidence. Andreason states that 
"Statements of counsel which suggest that the jury has 
obligation to convict defendant or some basis other than 
soley on the evidence before the jury are improper and 
beyond the broad latitude allowed in closing argument". 
In fact this latter statement applies to 
the market value issue and to the marital status attacks. 
With the value argument of the prosecutor he stresses 
over and over again that deposit value is market value. 
This says the jury has an obligation to use deposit value 
as market value. He does this by saying "is there a market 
value—a different market between retail and wholesale? 
I submit that you all know that there is." This doesnft 
use the law as it deals with market value but the prosecutor 
imaginative made up market value to persuade the jury that 
the expert witness doesn't matter and the jury can apply its 
own market value. In addition the prosecutor can't resist 
using the marital status of the defendant to manuever the 
jury away from the facts and evidence so that they would 
convict on allegations of untruthfulness though the State of 
Utah recognizes common law marriages. (Tr. 118) This is 
prosecutorial misconduct in that the defendant's claim to 
have a wife and child were utilized to imply that defendant 
was a liar and untruthful when common law marriages are lawful 
and recognized in Utah under U.C.A. 30-1-45. The defendant 
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requests that this court consider the above prejudicial 
remarks and reverse for prosecutorial misconduct. 
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED AT TRIAL 
IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL 
The Judge at trial owes the defendant consideration 
in regards to errors. If the court becomes aware of substantial 
and/or prejudicial errors then that case should be overturned. 
Hutchinson In the Thomas case there are several errors 
that are material and should have led the judge to grant 
a new trial. The first of these many errors is that the 
$8.00 value for pallets entered at trial was in error and 
was never corrected. This is a material error as to the 
element of theft which allowed the defendant to be convicted 
of a third degree felony when a misdemeanor was in order 
on the true market value of $4.50 a pallet. This correct 
market value was ignored even though an expert witness 
testified to it's authenticity. 
The defendant also contends that the failure of the 
Judge to rule on objectionsraised at trial was an error which 
prejudiced the defendant at trial. The defendant also 
argues that allowing allegation on his marital status was 
an material error. 
In addition the court failed to present the correct 
jury insturction to the jury concerning value which is an 
error on a material element and which is reversible error. 
In all the Judge should have granted a new trial 
on the errors that took place at trial. After the trial 
the Judge was presented with newly discovered evidence at 
a Motion for New Trial Hearing. The new evidence which 
was presented at this hearing showed that the Judge erred in 
allowing the wrong value to go to the jury. The evidence 
presented was Affidavits of experts in the pallet business 
showing the Market Value of the pallets as $4.50 and not 
$8.00. This evidence was not presented at trial by defense 
counsel and would have lowered the value of the 40 pallets 
to less than $250.00. This would have lowered the sentencing 
from a 3rd Degree Felony to a Class A Misdemeanor. 
The above errors at trial denied the defendant 
his right to a fair trial, and due process of law. Without 
this courts reversal defendant will have been denied his 
constitutional rights. 
VI THE EVIDENCE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO 
CONVICT THE DEFENDANT OF THE THEFT 
Where the sufficiency of the evidence is 
inconclusive or inherently improbable a criminal conviction 
will be reversed if reasonable minds must have entertained 
reasonable doubt that defendant committed crime. Utah v. Harmon, 
767 P.2d 567 (Utah Apr)., 1989). In the Thomas case the jury 
convicted the defendant of a third degree felony where there 
is reasonable doubt that he did take the pallets with a 
35 
purpose to deprive. When at Knox McDaniel the defendant 
showed his license to the secretary writing the contract 
when giving information to her. A person trying to steal 
does not use his real name produce I.D. and give phone number 
and license plate number. The jury relied on the two 
errors to convict even thouqh the errors were made by the 
secretary writing the contract. 
The only other substantial evidence against 
the defendant otherwise is his admission to the police 
officer made to get out of trouble. Other than this the 
jury had no reason to convict. In fact, Thomas had 3000 
pallets he could have used had he not had to complete a 
contract immediately and had no reason to steal pallets. 
Thomas argues that the jury erred and used errors at trial 
to convict Thomas. Without these errors defendant would not 
have been found guilty. State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091 
(Utah, 1988) States that the appeals courts will look at 
entire record and where there is technical failure or 
irregularity in the proceeding a reversal is in order. 
In the Thomas case the entire trial was traught 
with technical failures, irregularity and errors that 
raise the question as to whether defendant would have been 
found guilty in these absence. In closing the defendant 
argues that this case should be remanded for a new trial 
where the merrits can be weiahec more honestly and in a 
proper context so that defendant might have a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant has noted several instances of 
improprieties and/or errors each of which standing alone, 
had a substantial adverse effect on his right to a fair 
trial. The defendant asks that this court consider each 
of these errors ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
wrong jury instruction, the v/rona market value, prosecutorial 
misconduct, judicial err and lack of intent as grounds for 
refersing the trie.l court decision. 
should this court feel that none of such 
improprieties independently deprived defendant of a fair 
trial, it is argued that the cummulative effect of them all 
serve as grounds for determination that in the totality 
of the circumstances defendant was unfairly prejudiced and 
denied due process of law and should be granted a new trial. 
State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987). 
DATED this ~ 2 ^ day of January, 1990. 
2 2 5 ^ — 
DAVID J. BgRGEAU 
Attorney for Defendant 
WADE FARRAWAY 
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MR. REWARD: Thank you, Your Honor. 
State calls John Erickson. 
THE CLERK: What's his name again? 
MR. HEWARD: John Erickson. 
JOHN ERIC ERICKSON, 
being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as 
follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
RY MR. HEWARD: 
Q Please, give us your full name. 
A John Eric Erickson. 
Q Mr. Erickson, where are you employed? 
A At a place called Knox McDaniel Company. 
Q What is Knox McDaniel? 
A Knox McDaniel Company produces livestock and poultry 
and swine vitamin and mineral premixes. 
Q All right. You say they produce them. Are you 
iy actually a manufacturing outfit? 
jgj A Yes, 
20 I Q As part of Knox McDanielrs business, commerce and 
2) enterprise, do you receive product in — I guess in a 
22 J bulk form and take them out in a manufactured form? 
23 | A Yes, we do. 
24 J Q All right. Do you receive quite a great deal of 
25 different products in at Knox McDaniel? 
19 
ti Yes, we do. 
Q Do those products come in on pallets? 
A Yes. 
Q How long have you been with Knox McDaniel, Mr. 
Erickson? 
A 1 , two and a half years. 
Q And what is your position? 
A Plant manager. 
0 All right. Were you so employed as the plant manager 
on the tenth of January, 1989? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q All right. Did you come in contact, Mr. Erickson, 
with someone who identified themself to you inquiring 
about pallets that could be rented from you or purchased 
from you? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you know who that person was? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q And who was that? 
A He -- his name is Greg Thomas. 
Q Okay. Do you see Mr. Thomas in court today? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q And is he, in fact, the defendant seated to the 
immediate right of Mr. Froerer? 
A Yes, he is. 
20 
1 Q How did that contact come about between yourself and 
2 the defendant? 
3 A He just came up and approached me and he said that 
4
 he was in search of some pallets and was inquiring with 
5 me to see if we had any that he could borrow. Fie told me 
6 that he was short of some pallets. He said: Do you have 
7 about a hundred pallets? And I said: No, we don't. We 
8 have about -- actually we went and looked at our stock 
9 of pallets and I says: We can give you around 40 of 
10 them, and he said: That's fine. He told me that he 
11 was using these pallets in -- in the moving of rock to 
12 a location around the area. 
13 Q Did he represent to you that he was representing a 
14 pallet company or worked for a pallet company? 
15 A Mo, he didn't. 
16 Q Now, does Knox McDaniel normally rent pallets or sell 
17 pallets or anything like that? 
18 A No, they don't. 
19 Q Do you recall whether or not the defendant ever 
20 inquired if you had any broken pallets? 
21 A No. He was quite picky of what he wanted. He just 
22 wanted the four-way pallets. 
23 Q Do you have broken pallets there? 
24 A Yes, we do. 
25 Q And what would you — what do you do with broken 
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1 Q (By Mr. Heward) Mr. Erickson, I show you what !s 
2 been marked State's Proposed Exhibit Number One. Do you 
3 recognize that? 
* A Yes f I do. 
5 Q What is that? 
6 A This is the contract that the secretary drew up. 
7 Q That is not in your handwriting? 
8 I A No, it isn't. 
9 0 Have you seen that before? 
10 A Yes, I did. 
11 Q And when was that? 
12 A We -- they -- one of the secretaries called back 
13 inquiring about this, and I says do you have the contract, 
14 which the secretary did write up. And this is the one 
15 that she showed me and that's when I did call the 
16 officer. 
17 Q Ho you have a recollection -- I !m going to ask you 
18 to look specifically at the license plate number 
19 provided on there. Do you know whether or not that's 
20 the same number provided -- or the same number you went 
21 out and wrote down? 
22 A No, it isn't. 
23 Q How is it different? 
24 A It is different by the v. 
25 Q All right. One letter in it? 
10 
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1 I A One letter, 
2 Q Okay. Does that document accurately represent what 
3 you agreed to do? 
4 A No, it doesn ' t, 
5 Q All right. How is it different? 
6 A It said -- the $30 that he gave, but we agreed on 
7 a $50 deposit 
8 0 Is there anything else that differs between what 
g I you agreed and what that represents? 
A Just the license plate number, 
H I Q Okay. Thank you. 
12 I believe you indicated that approximately a month 
13| after these pallets went out that you made some effort 
14 j to get them back. 
15 i A Yes 
16| Q Please tell the jury what you did, 
17 | A Well, at first I -- I called the phone number and 
18I that phone number was not -- it was not Greg Thomas' 
19 phone number. It was a lady that didn't know what was 
20 going on. And I asked her if her husband was in the 
21 | pallet business and he said no -- or she said no, he 
22 I works at Children's Primary Hospital. And then her 
23 
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husband called me back and says: Hey, I don't do any 
pallets and I don't even have a truck. I don't know. 
25 And then after that, I -- I inquired about the 
25 
1 license number and that's when I got the information, 
2 inquiring about his -- the address that the officer -- the 
3 officer gave me, then I inquired about the license 
4 number. 
5 Q Was it at that point that you noticed that there was 
6 a difference? 
7 A Say that again, 
8 Q Did you actually perceive that there was a difference 
9 between the license plate number that you wrote down and 
10 what was on this Knox McDaniel stationary? 
11 A Yes. 
12 0 Did you report the missing pallets to the police? 
13 A Yes, I did. 
14 Q Did they come out and basically take the information 
15 from you? 
16 A They did. 
17 Q Mr. Erickson, do you know what the value of those 
18 40 pallets are? 
19 MR. TROERER: Objection, Your Honor. Establish 
20 a foundation as to his knowledge. 
21 MR. REWARD: I was going to do that, Your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Why don't you go ahead. 
23 Q (By Mr. Heward) Tell me about your --
24 THE COURT: You may answer that question yes or 
25 no. 
4 
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1 0 (By Mr. Heward) Could you identify State's Proposed 
2 Exhibit Number Two? 
3
 I A Yesf I do. These are accounts and, also, people 
that we ship products to. 
5 J Q Where did that come from? 
6
 A That came from our files. 
7 Q Are those accurate -- are those photocopies of your 
8 actual invoices? 
9 A Yes, they are. 
10 Q Are those accurate? 
H A Yes. As far as I know, yes. 
12 0 Okay. Did you make the photocopies? 
13 A I did not. 
!4 Q All right. But you can look at those and tell that 
15 those are accurate to the best of your knowledge? 
16 A Yes. 
17 I Q On those invoices is there a particular amount or 
value assessed on each pallet that goes out? 
19 I A Yes, there is. 
20 Q And what is that value? 
18 
21 /^^^ MR- FROERER: Objection, Your Honor. That 
22 xfelue is determined legally. The fact that they're on 
23 / an invoice established by his own company is not the 
24 / value we're going to be talking about today, and I would 
25\J object to this information being told to the jury. 
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1I MR. FROERER: Nothing further. 
2 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
3 BY MR. HEWARD: 
• Q Mr. Enckson, did you ever see the defendant after he 
5 left where you were and went to the front of your business 
6 establishment? 
7 A Mo, I didn't. 
8 Q Mr. Froerer asked you several questions about the 
9 value of pallets. Do you have any knowledge as to what 
10 pallets -- what fee Knox McDaniel is charged for pallets 
11 that come in with product that you receive? 
12 A Yes, I am. They usually are charged the amount as 
13 stated. 
14 Q All right. What amount is that? 
15 A Of $8. 
16 Q So you're not adding anything on to the pallets once 
17 they come into Knox McDaniel? 
18 A No. 
19 MR. HEWARD: Thank you. 
20 RECROSS-EXAMINATION 
21 BY MR. FROERER: 
22 Q Mr. Enckson, is this fee of $8 for new four-way 
23 pallets? 
24 A When they come in they are not brand new, no. 
25 Q They're in good shape? 
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1 Q What was your specific job or your duties for Knox 
2 McDaniel? 
3 A I was a secretary. I worked part-time, usually two 
4
 and a half days a week, two to two and a half days a week. 
5 Just basically office duties, typing, filing, phone. Talk 
6 to people as they'd come in, help with the customers. 
7 Q Calling your attention specifically to January tenth, 
8 do you recall coming in contact with someone who identifie 
9 himself to you as Greg Thomas? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q How was it that contact came about? 
12 A John, in the back, called up front on the phone and 
13 asked -- told me that there would be a gentlemen coming 
14 up front that was going to borrow some -- 40 pallets and 
15 he would be returning them in about a week; and I was to 
16 just write down on a piece of paper the date that he was 
17 borrowing the pallets and he was going to leave a $50 
18 deposit and that we was to have — you know, to get his 
19 license number and his phone number and have him sign 
20 the paper. And then I was to hold this in an envelope 
21 with his $50 and — in the office until he returned the 
22 pallets. 
23 Q Okay. And did someone come to you and represent that 
24 they were, in fact, that individual? 
25 A Yes. 
All 
A 
Q 
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kinds of things happen in offices; isn't that true? 
It always happens, yes. 
Now, are you aware that the license plate number and 
the phone number listed on this paper are not the correct 
numbers of -- belonging to the defendant or the fellow 
that talked to you that day? 
A I didnft know that until about a month ago. 
Q You are aware of it now? 
A Yes. 
Q And you are aware of which numbers are off? 
A No. I donft know. 
Q If I were to tell you that -- I'm going to show you 
Exhibit One. I guess you've seen it. (Tendering 
document to the witness.) 
If I were to tell you that the V in the license 
number was actually a B, do you feel it could be 
possible that maybe you heard a V but he really said B 
because of the similarities? 
A Anythingfs possible, but he did sign it as -- after 
I wrote it down as verification. 
Q Of course, I guess it's possible that he didn't read 
what you'd written either, isn't it? 
A Anything's possible. 
Q And the same in the telephone number. I can't 
remember offhand which number in the phone number is off, 
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1 A Yes* 
2 Q What did you do once you received that? 
3 A Went back out to Knox McDamel to reintervie^v the 
4 complainant to see if anything else could be picked up 
5 other than the initial officer's report, as far as 
6 information goes. 
7 Q And that was Mr. Erickson? 
8 A Yes , it was. 
9 Q What did you do once you had gathered your own 
10 information or taken the story yourself? 
H A Well, what I originally did was run the license 
12 plate myself. The first one which was on the contract 
13 was a non-existent registration for the State of Utah. 
14 The second was registered to a Greg Thomas at 1498 
15 South 400 East in Salt Lake City. The phone number had 
16 already been checked so there v/as no point in rechecking 
17 that. We just assumed that it was a bad phone number 
18 and, of course, now that it v/as a bad license number. 
19 0 Were you able to ascertain where the defendant was 
20 living? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q What did you do once you ascertained that? 
23 A Well, what -- what I had to start actually with is 
24 what we call skip trace. We now have the person who we 
25 think is probably using the right name and leaving a bad 
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trail of information, so what we try to do is update 
information and place ourselves at the same place he is 
at some point in the future. 
Updated information did give us a new address 
eventually on Mr. Thomas; also showed him to be connected 
to a Rocky Mountain Pallet Company out of Salt Lake City. 
Also tied him definitely to that truck which -- well, it 
was actually registered to a C30 flatbed truck. 
When we obtained as much as I could, found out about 
him, the first thing I wanted to do was go to Salt Lake 
and try to make a contact with Rocky Mountain Pallet. 
That was on the 28th, I believe, of February. I took 
Detective Alexander with me. We drove to the reported 
address of Rocky Mountain Pallet only to find that that 
was actually, I believe, R and M Automotives and not 
Rocky Mountain Pallet. Rocky Mountain Pallet had been 
there sometime in the past, I believe last year, and 
had gone out of business. They had disappeared fairly 
rapidly with no forwarding --
MR. FROERER: Objection, Your Honor, to the 
characterization of whoever Rocky Mountain Pallet is. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Why don't you go ahead with 
the questioning. 
Q (By Mr. Reward) Once you determined that the place 
of business is no longer there, did you do any further 
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attempt to locate the defendant? 
A 
to 
was 
the 
The only thing left to do at that point was to go 
the most current address I had obtained on him which 
4500 South 1875 East in Salt Lake. 
In route to that location, but prior to getting to 
actual residence, I spotted — the flatbed truck was 
found, I believe on 45th South. 
Q 
had 
A 
I b< 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Of ] 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
This was the flatbed truck that the license plate 
— 
That's correct. I did a traffic stop on the vehicle 
alieve at 45th and Highland. 
All right. Was the defendant driving the vehicle? 
He was. 
Was there anyone else with him? 
No. 
Did you inform him of why you stopped him? 
First I had him produce identification in the form 
registration and Utah Operator's License. 
You do — 
I'm sorry. 
I'm sorry. 
You do not wear a uniform — 
No. 
— being in the Detective Division. 
No. 
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1 Q Do you drive a marked police car? 
2 A No, I do not, 
3 Q When you say you pulled him over, do you have any 
4
 type of emergency lights or anything like that? 
5 A Yes. I have emergency equipment, lights and siren. 
6 They are, however, concealed until theyfre used. 
7 Q Once you pulled him over and you identified yourself, 
8 what happened? 
9 A Obtained his identification, made sure that I was — 
10 this was the Greg Thomas that I was looking for. Told him 
11 why he had been stopped, that I wanted to know about the 
12 pallets that he had taken from Ogden. 
13 Q What did he tell you when you — prior to doing 
14 that — before I ask that question — you stopped the 
15 individual. Did you advise him of his Miranda Rights? 
16 A I did, outside the vehicle at the — we were next to 
17 some gas pumps at a convenience store where he'd actually 
18 pulled over. 
19 Q Did you question him in any way prior to that? 
20 A I may have asked about the pallets just prior to 
21 that, but then I immediately advised him. 
22 Q Did he indicate that he understood those rights? 
23 A Yes, he did. 
Q And having those in mind, did he agree to talk to 24 
25 you 9 
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A Yes, about the pallets. 
Q All right. Did he tell you what had happened to the 
pallets? Did he acknowledge that he had the pallets? 
A He didn't acknowledge that he had them. He 
acknowledged that he had, in fact, taken them. 
Q All right. What specifically did he tell you, to 
the best of your recollection? 
A Initially he indicated that he had taken them and 
was going to return them, simply hadn't got around to it 
yet. I confronted him about the bad information on the 
con 
you 
up 
was 
and 
Q 
tha 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
tak 
A 
tract and his ini 
look that isn't 
with: But you su 
writing it down. 
drove off in a d 
What do yo mean 
t question? 
Correct. He di 
What did you do 
Arrested him. 
All right. Was 
en care of? 
tial response to 
my handwriting. 
that was: Well, if 
And I followed that 
pplied that information for whoever 
And he skirted that issue completely 
ifferent direction of conversation. 
"he skirted" it? 
d not respond to 
He didn't answer 
that at all. 
at that point, Detective? 
his vehicle secured or how was that 
Yeah. His vehicle -- since there was a parking lot, 
I went into the convenience store and asked the manager 
of the convenience s tore if it would be all right if Mr. 
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could get the charges dropped at which point I explained 
to him: I can't not arrest you. I can't make these 
charges go away. 
He had told me that he could get the pallets back. 
I told him that, you know, telling the truth, owning up 
to the responsibility and getting it out in the open could 
go a long way with what ultimately occurred in the case 
against him. And his response to that was he'd tell me 
what happened, which he then did. 
Q And what specifically did he tell you? 
A What he told me was that he had already had one 
deal go sour on him on the day that he obtained these 
pallets up here in Ogden, and he did not want to drive 
back to Salt Lake light loaded and with only $30, and so 
he had done this deal with Knox McDaniel. Said that he 
had never done it before. 
He admitted to giving that information with respect 
to the telephone number; he admitted to giving bad 
information with respect to his license number. He said 
that he immediately drove the pallets down to Salt Lake 
to APCO Pallet Company where he had sold the pallets for 
$1 60. 
He said he just did not think that anyone would make 
such a big deal out of pallets. 
Q Okay. What happened once you arrived back in Ogden? 
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1 Q What did that mean to you? 
2 A What do you mean? 
3 Q Telling the truth could go a long way as to what 
4 would happen to him in the system? 
5 A That goes toward when he finally gets to court and 
6 the evidence — and I was explaining the evidence to 
7 him -- clearly showed that: dumber one, he had taken 
8I the pallets; number two, that he had not taken them back; 
9 number three, that either he or someone else whom he 
10 knew was m possession of the pallets, that he had 
11 caused a loss to the company which was a crime, which 
12 was a third degree felony. 
13 That information was going to be going to court 
14 because he was under arrest and was going to jail and 
15 he was either going to have to face the court owning up 
16 to responsibility and trying to make amends or he was 
17 going to have to tell the court the evidence is all 
18 wrong and I don't know anything about it. 
19 I Q Is that what you really meant when you told him that? 
20 A Sure. It's a standard line. 
21 Q Okay. You weren't promising things hoping he would 
22 say something? 
A There wasn't a thing I could do for him and I told 
him that. 
23 
24 
25 Q It sounded like a promise though, didn't it? 
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1
 we looked at broken pallets. They were outside 
2 standing right -- they were sitting right outside there. 
3
 And I guess it was getting kind of late there or something 
4
 and he said -- I told him — there was only like ten 
5 there. I asked him for 40. I never asked him for 100 
6
 pallets. I asked him for 40 pallets specifically because 
7 thatfs all I needed and that's all I could haul on my 
8 truck at the time because I already had pallets on my 
9 truck. I never put more than 90 pallets on my truck and 
10 I already had 45 or 55 pallets on my truck at the time. 
11 All I needed was 40. 
12 And I asked him for them and he didn't -- and I don't 
13 know how it came about, but he said -- basically said --
14 kind of said: To hell with it, I'll give you 40 
15 pallets and you leave a $50 deposit or whatever and get 
16 them back to me. 
17 I said: No problem. I said: All I've got is 
18 50—or 30 bucks on me and that's all I can leave, but --
19 and -- I'm nervous, but --
20 0 Take a deep breath. 
21 A And so he gave me the pallets and -- and, I mean, 
22 I wasn't hiding anything. You know, my truck was parked 
23 right there, the license plate was right there. And -- and 
24 I went into the place and he said: Well, just give her 
25 your driver's license and you_ phone number or whatever. 
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1 Fine. I went in, I put my license, my driver's 
2 license on the thing right there and she goes: Well, 
3 don't worry about it. Just, you know, what's you license 
4
 plate number. I told her 6436BE. She wrote down VE. 
5 And then I told her my phone number was 272-3052. For 
6 some reason she wrote down 3051 . 
7 Q Now, wait a minute. How do you know she wrote those 
8 down? 
9 A Well, that's -- I don't know. That's what she wrote 
10 down. That's the conclusion of all this. She obviously 
11 got my phone number wrong and that's the whole problem 
12 with this whole matter. 
13 Q Did you see her write down those numbers wrong at 
14 that time? 
15 A No, I didn't. It was really sitting at the desk. 
16 You kind of look over and there's a thing right there 
17 and I didn't even -- you know, the thing kind of comes 
18 over like this and hangs over and she was like underneath 
19 it and just asked me and I told her --
20 Q So you didn't see --
21 A She just put it up there and I signed it and that 
22 was it. It all happened in about -- just a matter of 
23 seconds. 
24 Q So when you say she wrote down the wrong numbers, 
25 you didn't see what she wrote down. 
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thief. I never have had anything like that happen. 
And he arrested me right there. I said: Wait a 
minute. Let me call him. I'll give them their pallets 
back right now. He said: No. He -- you know, it's 
already -- it's out of their hands. Even if they wanted 
them back, they can't. It's in the State's hands now 
and that was it. 
And, in fact, when I got arrested and he cuffed me, 
all the way to Ogden, and when I came back home that same 
day I went and got those pallets back and I was going to 
return them, put them in my back yard. I was going to 
return them. I was going to return them and they said — 
they said: Do not return them. Do not go over there and 
return them because it's -- whatever. 
MR. FROERER: Your Honor, may I look at Exhibit 
One? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
Q (By Mr. Froerer) ^reg, I'm showing you wh_at' s been 
marked 
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A Ba 
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was -- I had never had anything like this happen to me 
before and on the way up I was a little worried about it 
and everything and -- and I was asking him, you know, 
what are you doing, what's going to happen to me, you 
know, because I got an eight month old baby at home and 
everything. I left my wife at home. She had no idea 
I was just on my way to work, and cuffed and going up, 
you know, to Ogden handcuffed and arrested all of a 
sudden for 40 pallets because she -- nobody ever called 
me about it and I did forget. 
Anyway, so we're driving up there and I was a little 
worried and I was asking them, you know, what's going 
to happen to me. Am I going to jail or what are you 
doing? 
He kept saying, you know, well, where ' s the pallets 
at? Tell me the truth of what happened. An~d I was 
telling him where the pallets were and what -- what was 
actually, you know, what I did with them and it just like 
wasn't good enough. And he was saying well, you know, 
just tell me — you know, tell me what -- finally after 
we were halfway up to Kaysville I said hey, all right. 
I took them over to APCO Pallets and I got $4 a piece 
for them. 
You know, that was it. I told him what he wanted 
to hear and he said well, now that you told the truth, 
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out of the hearing of the jury, after which proceedings 
resumed in open court as follows:) 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HEWARD: 
Q Mr. Thomas, I believe you just testified that you're 
married and have a child; is that right? 
A I'm living with a woman. I've been with a woman for 
seven years. 
Q Isn't it true you just testified you are married and 
have --
A It's a common law marriage. 
Q So you're not, in fact, married? 
A No. 
Q So, in fact --
A It's a common law marriage. In everybody's mind and 
in the State's mind I'm married. 
0 Isn't it true when you came in when you were initially 
arrested --
MR. FROERER: Objection, Your Honor. He's 
answered the question he's going to be asked at this 
time. He says he's not married and only by common law 
and that's the answer to the question. 
THE COURT: I think he's still entitled to pose 
the question. Overrruled. 
0 (By Mr. Heward) Isn't it true that you went through 
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a process called OR release, an individual talked to 
you about being released? Do you remember that, own 
recognizance release? 
A When was this? 
Q The day you were arrested. 
A I believe so. 
Q So that you could get out. 
Isn't it true that he specifically posed to you 
whether or not you were married and at that time you 
didn't say I was married and have a child? Isn't that 
true? 
A I don't remember what I talked to him about that day. 
Q Well, you have no reason to doubt if he put down you 
told him single, you have no reason to doubt that he 
wrote down what you told him, correct? 
You can answer that with a yes or a nc, please. 
A Could you repeat the question? 
Q You have no reason to doubt this individual put 
down any information other than what you told him, 
correct? 
A I believe so. 
Q Mow, your testimony as I understand, Mr. Thomas, is 
that when you went in Knox McDaniel that you only 
inquired about broken pallets. 
A That's right. That's what I do every time. 
4 
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1 farm them out to whoever you could sell them to, probably 
2 in smaller quantities. You probably couldn't find 
3
 J someone to take all 13,000. Fair statement? 
A Right. 
5 Q You indicated you still had some? 
6
 A Thousands, yes. I probably have two or 3,000 left 
7
 of those. 
8 Q Okay. 
9
 A I don't really have access to them. 
10 Q Now, you indicated to Mr. Froerer you hadn't been 
11 to APCO Pallet Company for over a year; is that right? 
12 A Between — since -- I haven't been to APCO Pallet 
13 Company since I did the Farmer Jack thing which was 
14 approximately between seven — six, seven, eight months 
15 and a year. I can't -- I don't really remember when. 
16 J it was about eight months ago and the only time that I 
went to APCO then was because I know the guy that owns 
it and I was -- you know, working on a thing that maybe 
19 I he was going to buy them. 
20 Q All right. When you were telling Detective Stubbs 
21 J the story, as you characterize it, as one simply to tell 
him what he wanted so that things were going to work 
23 j out, you chose to tell him that you took the pallets to 
24 APCO, correct, the pallets you picked up from Knox 
25 McDaniel, correct? 
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t A While we were up -- at first I told him the truth, 
2 but when we were halfway to Kaysville, past Kaysville, 
3 after I was handcuffed and he wouldn't tell me anything 
4 then I said yes --
5 Q Then you told him --
6 A — I took them to APCO. 
7 Q Then you told him that you had taken the pallets the 
8 same day to APCO Pallet Company and sold them, correct? 
9 A Right. 
0 And your testimony would be, Mr. Thomas, that you gave 
Sheryl Cheever your correct phone number? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And you gave her your correct license plate number? 
14 A Right. I even threw my driver's license on the table. 
15 
17 
19 
20 
21 
23 
And it was her error in writing them down, correct? 
Y6 A Definitely. That's the whole problem why I'm sitting 
here right now. 
13 0 That's the whole problem, 
A That's the problem. All they had to do was call me 
and I would have had their pallets back the next day. 
Q What was the emergency that you needed the pallets 
22 for, Mr. Thomas? 
A It wasn't a dire emergency. I never told anybody it 
24 was an emergency, 
25 Q You didn't tell anyone it was an emergency? 
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1 I A No, there was no emergency. 
2 Q Isnft that how Mr. Froerer characterized it in his 
3 opening statement is that you needed them in an emergency? 
4
 A You'll have to ask him. 
5 Q Isn't that how he characterized it? Didn't you hear 
6 him? 
7 A You'll have to ask him. I don't know. 
8 I Q You didn't hear him? You didn't hear him, sir? 
9 I A I don't know how he characterized it. I don't speak 
10 for him or anything. 
H Q Certainly there was no emergency because you had 
12 thousands of pallets sitting back in Salt Lake, correct? 
13 A No, they weren't in Salt Lake. They were in bountiful. 
14 Q But still there would be no emergency because you 
15 had thousands of them, correct? 
16 A I had access to pallets. 
17 Q Well, you had access to them. You didn't actually 
18 have pallets? 
19 A Well, if I had pallets then I wouldn't have to have 
20 gone to Knox McDaniel to get pallets. 
21 Q That's correct, you wouldn't have. 
22 MR. REWARD: Thank you. No further questions. 
23 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
24 BY MR. FROERER: 
25 Q Why did you need the pallets, Creg, these 40 pallets? 
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1 I A Because I -- I had a -- a purchase that I was -- an 
2 order that I was filling, and I went to the cannery and 
3 they didn't have the right kind of pallets. There's a 
4 four-way pallet and a two-way pallet, and they only had 
5 a certain amount of four-ways. And the guy that I was 
6 I getting them from didn't know that there was a difference 
7 between two-ways and four-ways. He didn't have enough of 
3 I the four-ways and I couldn't take the two-ways, so I 
g j needed some four-ways so I went by Knox McDaniel and 
they had the four-ways. 
0 Who was this guy you were selling them to or --
A It was a warehouse. 
10 
11 
12 
13 Q Was — 
14 
15 
A It was a friend of mine. It's out by the airport 
Certified Warehouse. 
IS I Q The Ogden Airport or Salt Lake Airport? 
17 A Salt Lake Airport. 
18 I Q Okay. Mow, you say your truck was full of pallets --
roughly half full of pallets? 
A Half full. 
Q Where had you picked up those pallets? 
22 | A From the cannery. 
23 j Q Here in Ogden? 
24 A Yes. 
25 J Q What time of day was this you picked them up from 
19 
20 
21 
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1 I Guilty of the lesser included offense of Theft, a 
2 Class R Misdemeanor; or 
3 Not guilty; as your deliberations may result. This 
4 being a criminal case, it requires a unanimous concurrence 
5 of all jurors to find a verdict. 
6 After counsel have argued the case, the bailiff will 
7 escort you to the jury room and you may commence your 
8 deliberations. You should first choose a foreperson as 
9 J your presiding officer. The foreperson should sign 
whatever verdict you agree upon. When you have agreed 
and the verdict has been signed, notify the bailiff that 
you have agreed, but do not reveal the verdict to him. 
13 I The foreperson shall keep the verdict in their possession 
14 I until I instruct you otherwise. All of you must agree 
to the same verdict in a criminal case. 
16 I Are you prepared to proceed with your closing 
17 arguments? 
18 I MR. REWARD: Yes, Your T?onor. 
THE COURT: You may proceed then, Mr. Ileward. 
MR. REWARD: I don't have the voice people 
normally have a problem hearing and that's somewhat 
10 
11 
12 
15 
19 
20 
21 
22 distracting for me to be looking at one or more of you 
23 
24 
with that in the way. 
Ladies and gentlemen, you are about to retire and 
25 determine what the facts of this case are: What's fact, 
111 
1 what's fiction, who told the truth, who didn't tell the 
2 truth, whether or not the facts that you heard convince 
3 you beyond a reasonable doubt that, in fact, this 
4 defendant committed a crime, the crime of theft, and if 
5 he did,what level of offense that is. 
6 I'd like to go through with you -- as indicated at 
7 the beginning, the State has the burden of proof to 
8 convince you beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of 
g the offense and nothing else. I've got to prove to your 
10 satisfaction what actually happened in this case. 
H Instruction number six, as the judge has went through, 
12 sets out the elements. We've got a theft charge here 
13 that is plead m the alternative. The reason it's 
14 plead in the alternative is because there may be more 
15 than one way you may be satisfied that it was committed. 
16 Instruction number six, when you look at it you'll 
17 see that it's either A or it's R. If you're satisfied 
18 with either one of those, he's guilty. It doesn't matter 
19 that perhaps four of you agree on the first one and four 
20 °f y ° u agree on the second one. ^s long as you agree 
21 that there was a theft that occurred and it occurred 
22 one of these two ways, then you should be satisfied with 
23 
24 
that beyond a reasonable doubt and have an obligation 
to return a conviction of guilt. 
25 Instruction number six indicates the following 
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1 elements: 
2 Number one: Said defendant, Gregory Douglas Thomas, 
3 Two: By deception, 
4
 Three: Obtained or exercised control over the 
5 property of Knox McDaniel Company, to-wit: wooden 
6 pallets, 
7 Four: With a purpose to deprive the owner thereof, 
8 Five: Of a value exceeding $250 but less than $1,000. 
9| Now, let's go through these. There's no question that 
Gregory Douglas Thomas is the defendant in this case. 
That' s uncontradicted. 
The second element, first part of the theft charge 
is by deception. What evidence do you have of a 
deception? 1 ask you to remember back, 
specifically to the testimony of John Erickson. What 
16 does John tell you? He tells you an individual comes 
17 
19 
21 
23 
24 
in, identifies himself as being his name, Mr. Thomas 
18 Tells him he's got a job to do. Tells them he's got 
rocks to haul. Tells him that he needs to rent some 
2o pallets 
An agreement is drawn up. You'll see Exhibit Number 
22 One signed by the defendant. The defendant leaves, 
never seen again. Ladies and gentlemen, that is 
deception. That's the deception that he used to get 
25 the 40 pallets from Knox McDaniel Company. 
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1 Obtained or exercised control over the property of 
2 Knox McDaniel. Unquestionably, he left with 40 pallets. 
3 The State's witnesses tell you that, the defendant tells 
4
 you that. He unquestionably left and had those in his 
5 possession. 
6 With the purpose to deprive the owner thereof. What 
7 evidence do we have indicating a purpose to deprive? 
8 Did the pallets ever come back? Did they come back 
9 within the terms of the agreement? Did they come back 
10 at all? 
11 What about the testimony brought out by Mr. Froerer 
12 of his client that, in fact, the day he picked them up 
13 he took them down and had a buyer for them. Is that 
14 an indication of evidence of a purpose to deprive. I 
15 submit to you it is. 
16 Of a value exceeding $250 but less than 1,000. 
17 There's a specific jury instruction, ladies and 
18 gentlemen, dealing with market value. What is the 
19 market value of the pallets? We've got 40 pallets. 
20 Various testimony comes in. 
21 Testimony of the victim in the case: The pallets 
22 cost me $8. Property comes in on them, property goes 
23 back on them. That's the value of the property to 
24 the victim. That's the value of the property in that 
25 market. 
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1
 We hear other testimony, hear testimony from the 
2 defendant that would lead the jury to believe if, in 
3
 I fact, you believe anything that he said, that it's only a 
Class B Misdemeanor. These are only pallets worth a 
5 | dollar, a dollar and a half. 
We hear from his expert. The value of pallets—we 
7
 I get a Defense Exhibit—puts a $4.50 value. Forty 
8 pallets, takes you up to roughly $180. 
9 What is the value of those pallets? Instructions 
10 tells you it's the market value. Well, what market 
11 are we talking about? Are we talking about the market 
12 of a wholesaler versus the market of a retailer? Are we 
13 talking about the market of someone who picks them up 
14 and takes them to someone else? 
15 I submit to you that the proper market, ladies and 
16 gentlemen, is the market of the victim in the case that 
17 deals with them. They cost him $8. When he passes it 
18 through, he charges $8. 
19 The second part of the way that the statute chose 
20 to charge theft deals with the rental agreement, State's 
21 Exhibit Number One. It's unquestionably a rental 
22 agreement. Defendant agrees to do certain things; in 
23 return for that the victim simply lets him take them. 
24 Thirty dollars was nothing more than a deposit, something 
25 to hopefully ensure that he would do what he said he 
1 1 5 
1 would do; that is, bring them back within a one week 
2 period of time essentially in the same condition. 
3 The elements set out in part two of the theft: 
4 Said defendant, Gregory nouglas Thomas, 
5 Two: having custody of wooden pallets, the property 
6 of Knox McDaniel Company, pursuant to a rental or lease 
7 agreement whereby it is to be returned in a specified 
8 manner or at a specified time, 
g J Three: intentionally failed to comply with the terms 
of the agreement concerning return so as to render such 
failure a gross deviation from the agreement. 
Unquestionably, the defendant had the pallets. He 
13 I tells you that. The other evidence indicates that. He 
14 I definitely had custody, definitely the property of Knox 
McDaniel, definitely a rental-lease agreement, definitely 
16 I to be returned at a specified time in a specified manner. 
17 j January 17th. 
18 | You'll get Exhibit One. Look at it. There's four or 
five lines on there. Very clear when it's to be returned, 
Mr. Erickson tells you ahead of time they orally agreed 
when it was to be returned. The defendant chooses not to 
do that. 
Three: he intentionally failed to comply with the 
terms. The defendant's story is that he forgot. He 
25 I deals in so many pallets that he didn't even think about 
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1 I those 40 he picked up from Knox McDaniel, and all 
2 somebody had to do was call. All somebody had to do was 
3
 say: Hey, where's my pallets. 
4
 But isn't it convenient that they're one letter off? 
5 Isn't it convenient that the license plate number is 
6
 different? I ask you to recall specifically 
7 cross-examination of Sheryl Cheever as well as the 
8 cross-examination of Mr. Erickson. Mr. Froerer 
9 cross-examined them regarding V versus B. Well, ladies 
10 and gentlemen, how much does one sound like two? 
11 Coincidence? Everybody lying? Everybody out to get this 
12 defendant? Mot hardly. 
13 Intentionally failed to comply with the terms 
14 concerning the return so as to render the failure a 
15 gross deviation. How much of a grosser deviation can you 
16 get when you don't return them at all? 
17 And then again, we get down to the value. 
18 There are also specific instructions which I'd like 
19 you to pay particular attention to; specifically, 
20 Instruction number four -- Instruction 14 and Instruction 
21 15. Those talk about the credibility of the witnesses, 
22 ladies and gentlemen. 
23 You are the judge. You are the fact finder in this 
24 case. You decide who to believe, you decide who to 
25 disbelieve. I ask you to recall the State's witnesses. 
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1 Is there anything that Mr. Erickson said that you don't 
2 believe? Was there anything about his demeanor or the 
3 way that he acted that would indicate that he's not 
4
 telling the truth? 
5 What about .Ms. Cheever? What about the detective? 
6 Did their demeanor indicate to you that they're not 
7 telling the truth? 
8 What about the demeanor of the defendant when he took 
9 the stand, something that you all had an opportunity to 
10 view. Did he look like somebody that was lying? I 
11 submit to you that he did. I submit to you that it was 
12 fairly obvious to notice the changes in the story. 
13 I ask you to look specifically at Number 15 which 
14 indicates: If you believe any witness has testified 
15 falsely as to any material fact in the case, you are at 
16 liberty to disregard the whole testimony of such witness. 
17 Ladies and gentlemen, I submit that is the only thing 
18 you can do with the testimony of the defendant. There 
19 is absolutely no credibility, there's absolutely no 
20 reliability in anything he said. 
21 How many stories did he tell? Well, let's see. He's 
22 initially confronted by Detective Stubbs. Detective Stubbs 
23 
24 
tells you -- what does he say? He says: Oh, I forgot 
about those pallets. I was going to return them. There's 
25 story number one. 
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1 Detective Stubbs places him under arrest. What's the 
2 next thing out of his mouth? What can I do to make this 
3 right? Is that a story change? 
4
 The vehicle proceeds up to Salt Lake — from Salt Lake 
5 to Ogden. Does the story change? 
6 Okay, Detective Stubbs, Ifll tell you what happened. 
7 I picked them up, took them that day to APCO Pallet 
8 Company, sold them for $160. Never intended them to 
9 get them back. I didn't think it would be a big deal 
10 for 40 pallets. Ifm a big pallet dealer. I deal in 
11 thousands of them, but I had to get 40 from Knox McDaniel 
12 Company. 
13 Another story change? He testified on the witness 
14 stand. Difference between what he was telling his 
15 lawyer and what he was telling me? There's a big 
16 difference, ladies and gentlemen. You've had an 
17 opportunity to view a man who's scrambling. 
18 He's got evidence, he's had an opportunity to hear 
19 the evidence the State has against him and he's got to 
20 try and conform his story through sympathy, through 
21 anything else he can to get you to buy it, to get you to 
22 ignore the facts of the case. 
23 I'm married, I've got a kid. Sympathy? Story change 
24 when I crossed him on it? You bet he did. Because you 
25 know why? Because he knew I had him. Because he'd 
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1 already told someone else that he wasn't married. Why 
2 does he throw that in? He wants your sympathy. He 
3 wants you to ignore the facts of the case. 
4
 Look very carefully, ladies and gentlemen, at those 
5 specific instructions talking about what weight to place 
6 on whose testimony. Consider who has the--who has the 
7 most to gain; consider who has the most to lose. 
8 Obviously another instruction that's going to play a 
9 fair amount in your decision is the beyond a reasonable 
10 doubt instruction. In fact, it's a new instruction for 
H this jurisdiction. It's one that I've never dealt with 
12 before and I'd like to go through it with you for my 
13 benefit as much as your own. 
14 Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a 
15 mere possible doubt; because everything relating to 
16 human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open 
17 to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of 
18 the case -- here they're talking about reasonable 
19 doubt -- it is that state of the case which, after the 
20 entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, 
21 leaves the mind of the jurors in that condition that they 
22 cannot say they feel an abiding conviction. 
23 The law does not require a demonstration of that 
24 degree of proof which, excluding all possibility of 
25 error, produces absolute certainty, for such "degree of 
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1 proof is rarely possible. 
2 We can't look inside someone's head. We can't run 
3 back to January tenth, watch the pallets loaded on the 
4 empty truck, see where those go from there, see what his 
5 intent was when he was talking to them and see what his 
6 intent was once he left. We have to rely on the facts 
7 that we have, external evidence. 
8 Beyond a reasonable doubt, ladies and gentlemen, is 
g not beyond all doubt. It's not beyond a shadow of a 
doubt. It's not look for a doubt. It's not give the 
defendant the benefit of the doubt. It's a common sense 
standard, considering all of the evidence you've heard 
concerning -- considering all of the people who testified, 
you have an abiding conviction that he committed a theft. 
That's what it boils down to. 
Ladies and gentlemen, speeches are often not long 
17 enough for the speaker and not short enough for those who 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
hear it. And I don't think it's necessary that I sit 
here and reiterate and reiterate and reiterate. You've 
heard the evidence. You've got the facts. And I ask 
you to decide this case based upon the facts and those 
alone, not on sympathy, not on prejudice. 
I would submit to you that the evidence indicates to 
you, when you consider it that way, there is but one 
conviction you can return and that is a finding of guilty 
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1 I as charged, theft, a third degree felony. Thank you. 
2 MR. FROERER: Ladies and gentlemen, this is my 
3 one opportunity to address you, to show to you what we 
4
 believe the evidence really shows and to hopefully 
5 aid you in your deliberations in this case. 
6 It's my only shot. Mr. Ileward will get one more, 
7 I have to kind of predict a little bit about what he 
8 might say, and if I miss something, forgive me. I'm 
9 trying to cover everything I possibly can remember that 
10 I think might be helpful, though T do intend to be brief 
11 on the other hand. 
12 I'm very grateful to live m our country that provides 
13 us with the ]ury system. The jury system is a great 
14 system and it was created to override abuses in prior 
15 systems that lead people to come to America. That's one 
16 of the things that we have that a lot of countries don't 
17 is a jury of our peers. 
18 The State suggests that you are here to determine 
19 the facts. I submit that's true. You're also here to 
20 apply the law and to exact fairness. After a 
21 determination, you are to determine what is fair; what's 
22 a fair resolution to this case. 
23 It's a protection -- your -- the fact you're here is 
24 a protection to the common people, to us. I consider 
25 me -- myself to be a common person and it's a protection 
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1 State cannot be. If he just didn't take them back by 
2 error, he can't be a criminal as they're alleging. 
3 Once again, ladies and gentlemen, this is a civil 
4 case. It should have been taken care of by a lawsuit for 
5 damages. 
6 Thank you for your attention and I know you'll come 
7 back with a just verdict. 
8 THE COURT: Mr. Reward. 
9 MR. HEWARD: Thank you, Your Honor. Ladies and 
10 gentlemen, do you find any conflict in defense counsel's 
11 closing argument and the way they represent the facts? 
12 I Do you find any conflict that in one breath they tell you 
13 I my man's not guilty, lie didn't do it, a.nd then in the 
14 next breath they say if he did, he's only guilty of a 
15 lesser included offense? Do you find a conflict in that? 
16 You should because there's a distinct one there, 
17 We all have hobbies, as some of you disclosed. Mr. 
18 McCormick indicated he has horses. I have a real love 
19 for dogs, and that kind of a defense that you just heard 
20 I brings to mind a story that really exemplifies what 
21 | they're trying to do, 
22 A mailman was walking down the street. A dog came 
23 
24 
running out as he went to deposit some mail in the 
mailbox, bit him on the leg. He reported to supervisors 
25 who then contacted the individual who hadn't kept the 
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1 dog tied up. The Post Office instituted a proceeding 
2 and the individual was brought in who owned the dog. 
3 They said: Mr. Jones, your dog bit our postal worker. 
4
 Mr. Jones said: Well, that can't be. My dog doesn't have 
5 teeth, couldn!t have — couldnft have bit this guy. The 
6 individual pulls his pant leg up and sure enough, there 
7 were teeth marks. 
8 He said: You know, that can't be. My dog doesn't 
9 run loose. The Post Office paraded a couple of people 
10 in that live next door and they said the dog runs loose 
11 all the time. 
12 Well, he said: You know, you're right, but it still 
13 can't be because I don't have a dog. 
14 Ladies and gentlemen, that's essentially what they'd 
15 like you to believe. My man didn't do it. He's not 
16 guilty. He didn't have the intent to commit a theft, 
17 but if he did, he only committed a lesser included offense. 
18 The value is not enough for a felony. 
19 You all have experiences I ask you to draw upon as 
20 jurors. Obviously, market value is an issue. What is 
21 the market value? Is there a market value -- a different 
22 market between retail and wholesale? I submit that you 
23 all know that there is. 
24 Is there a market value difference between someone 
25 who has to pay $8 when a pallet rolls in the door and 
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1 someone who makes thousands of pallets? Did the defense 
2 produce for you an expert who's in the same "field as 
3 Knox McDaniel Corporation to say we don't pay SB a 
4
 pallet for our pallets, we only pay four or two? 
5 It's apples and oranges, ladies and gentlemen. It's 
6 not the same market. If, in fact, you had a vehicle 
7 stolen -- the vehicle was worth $1,000 -- the vehicle 
8 is taken down to a junkyard and $50 is given for it, 
9 what's the market value of that car to you? It's 
10 $1,000 because that's what you are out. It's not 50, 
11 it's not 500, it's not anything other than $1,000. 
12 And in this case, the market value is the market that 
13 Knox McDaniel is in and it's eight bucks a pallet. 
14 Eight dollars a pallet at 40 pallets puts you into the 
15 felony range. 
16 The testimony you've heard concerns a theft, a theft 
17 of 40 pallets, a value of $40 a piece -- $8 a piece, 
18 40 of them, $320. That's a third degree felony. Think 
19 about the market, ladies and gentlemen. 
20 You know, I hope you notice that everyone else is 
21 wrong but the defendant. Everyone else committed a 
22 mistake. Sheryl Cheever wrote -- made two mistakes, one 
23 right after the other. Wrote a telephone number down 
24 wrong, wrote the license plate number down wrong. Mr. 
25 Froerer made a comment, something that I -- he and I 
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1 haven't agreed on much. I would agree with that. He 
2 called his defendant foolish and I agree wholeheartedly 
3 with that, but I agree that it was foolish for another 
4 reason. 
5 I agree that it was foolish for not thinking that 40 
6 pallets was a big deal to somebody, for not thinking 
7 that they wouldn't mind, that they're not going to miss 
8 40 pallets. 
g Do you really believe the defendant's story, ladies 
10 and gentlemen. Do you really believe someone who -- in 
H his own testimony -- has access to thousands of pallets 
12 in Bountiful is going to drive to Ogden to pick up 40 or 
13 80 or whatever he said to take them back to Salt Lake 
14 City? I hope you don't because that is completely 
15 incomprehensible. 
16 You know, the defendant testified he rolled up 
17 here today -- nobody would let me bring the pallets back. 
18 Rolled up here in my truck, brought those pallets back. 
19 They're sitting right outside. It's a desperate action 
20 of a desperate man. This is the story that he'd like 
21 for you to believe today. 
22 Do you think Knox McDaniel would have taken those 
23 
24 
pallets back? Do you really believe that he didn't know 
what he was signing? Do you really believe that he 
25 simply forgot? Do you really believe any of the three 
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1 case. 
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ions and civil 
actions can arise out of the same set of circumstances. 
And the reason this is a crime is because the legislature 
of this state has said that theft is a crime, and that's 
exactly what we have is a theft. 
You bet Knox McDaniel could bring a civil action 
against him, but that doesn't mean that the State isn't 
bound to bring a criminal case. And it's not just a 
violation against them. Knox McDaniel is the victim, 
but it's a violation against each of you and everyone 
else in this state. 
We elect legislators, they enact laws and we are to 
abide by them. When we were here and when I was asking 
you questions on voir dire, I asked if you agreed that 
theft should be a crime and everyone said yes, we do 
agree theft should be a crime. I said: Do you agree or 
will you follow the lav; as it's given to you by the 
judge, and everyone said that they would. 
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1
 Well, ladies and gentlemen, I'm asking you to do 
2 that now. I'm asking you to do that now, I'm asking 
3 you to take these facts, sort through them, disregard the 
4
 ones that you know are false and you're going to end up 
5 with an abiding conviction of a theft and an abiding 
6 conviction of a felony theft, 
7 Thank you for your attention. I appreciate it very 
8 much. 
9 THE COURT: Would you swear the bailiff in, 
10 please? 
11 (WHEREUPON, at this time the bailiff is sworn in, 
12 after which the jury leaves the courtroom to begin 
13 deliberations at 5:08 P. M.) 
14 THE COURT: Incredible effort. I think the 
15 jury have been well presented the case. I've appreciated 
16 the presentation from both of the respective parties. 
17 Is there any post-trial motions that need to be 
18 made at this time? 
19 MR. FROERER: Mo, Your Honor. 
20 MR. HEWARD: Mot that I'm aware, Your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: I would — let me just kind of 
22 query you a little. I would — I would be inclined to 
23 give the jury three options. If they're going to be 
24 able to arrive at a decision fairly soon, to go ahead 
25 and arrive at a decision. If they'd like to have some 
